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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the specific legal content of the 1979 and 1993
Agreements on Government Procurement as well as the North American Free
Trade Agreement's Chapter Ten (Government Procurement). One chapter
addresses the use of free tr- !g, -ments, associated problems, and how the
agreements have been applied to c - public sector. The content of each of the
primary documents is analyzed and comparisons made between the documents
where applicable. Available data and studies are reviewed tc determine the effect
of the 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement on the curreit magnitude of
public procurement contracts and the possible effects on the future bidding
potential for suppliers of goods and services in the international government
procurement marketplace. Finally, the prospect for the continued influence of free
trade agreements on public sector contracting is examined.
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This paper examines the Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP) and the changes that have been made to the
Government Procurement Code (GPC) as a result of the General
Agreement on .Cariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in December 1993
at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of international trade
talks. Additionally, the government procurement chapter of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is discussed.
What impact has the original AGP had, and what will be the
impact of the new agreements?
Almost all governments are concerned not only with
acquiring goods and services, but with achieving economic
objectives that can be brought about by large government
purchases. As a result, protectionist buy-national policies
such as the Buy America Act (BAA) have been developed on the
belief that preferential treatment for domestic suppliers will
yield more economic benefit at home. The contrary philosophy
behind GATT and NAFTA is to utilize what economists term the
"Law of Comparative Advantage" to obtain maximum economic
benefit (Peterson 1980). This philosophy contends that all
trading partners will gain when they respectively specialize
in producing items where they are most efficient. Efficient
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producers will sell their products while correspondingly
spending their income to obtain items that they are less
efficient in producing. Even in situations where a purchaser
possesses an absolute advantage in production, it is
beneficial for that purchaser to trade with a partner who has
a comparative advantage so the purchaser can then concentrate
on other areas of production where they hold a comparative
advantage. Economists almost unanimously believe that the end
result of everyone specializing and trading in such a manner
is that employment and economies will expand as a result of a
multiplier effect and all parties will be better off (Gwartney
1992).
The Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) also known
as the Government Procurement Code (GPC or "the Code") under
the sponsorship of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) has served to promote free trade and reduce domestic
supplier preference in government procurement for 20 signatory
nations and 28 more designated Third World nations. The AGP
was implemented in the United States by the Trade Agreement
Act (TAA) of 1979. A new GPC was agreed upon in December 1993
at the Uruguay Round of international trade talks and will
take effect in 1996 NAFTA'S government procurement chapter
was also agreed upon in 1993.
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B. OBJECTIVES
This caper primarily explores the specific legal content
of thl L979 and 1993 Agreements on Government Procurement as
well as Chapter Ten of the 1993 North American Free Trade
Agreement. The content of each is analyzed and comparisons
between the agreements are made where they are informative.
Available data and studies are reviewed to determine the
effect of the 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement on the
current magnitude of public procurement contracts, the
possible effects on the future volume of international
government contracts, and finally the potential total
worldwide public market opportunities available. This
research will discuss the principal documents and analyze
their impact on trade opportunities.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: Based on historical
data, what is the probable effect on trade opportunities of
the North American Free Trade Agreement's government
procurement chapter and the Government Procurement Code of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade?
The following subsidiary research questions were developed
to support the primary question and to develop a detailed
knowledge of the international government procurement field:
(1) What are the purposes of NAFTA and GATT?
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(2) What are the specific features of NAFTA's government
procurement chapter and of the AGP?
(3) What similarities and differences exist between A) the
1979 AGP, B) NAFTA's government procurement chapter
and C)the 1993 AGP?
(4) What is the effect of the Buy American Act on intended
trade objectives of NAFTA and GATT?
(5) Has the 1979 AGP been successful in increasing
international trade opportunities?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Information was obtained from varied sources including the
primary Legal documents. Books, periodicals, news releases,
studies, and Congressional hearings were obtained through the
Naval Postgraduate School Library, the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, Stanford University's Law and Graduate
Business Libraries, Hastings Law Library, the Secretariat of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the University
of California, Santa Cruz Library.
Significant information including press releases,
pamphlets, statistical data and studies were obtained through
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
Contact was made early in the process with Mr. Mark Linscott,
the Director of International Government Procurement Policy at
USTR and chief U.S. negotiator on the Agreement on Government
Procurement during the later stages of the Uruguay Round. His
insights and interpretations were regularly obtained through
phone calls and a face-to-face interview in Washington, D.C.
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E. ORGANIZATION OF TEE RESEARCH
This thesis is divided into six chapters. This chapter
provides the general objectives of the study as well as the
research methodology which was utilized.
Chapter II reviews the theoretical concept of free trade
and how international trade agreements have been used to help
open international markets.
Chapter III reviews the terms of the primary legal
documents and compares their features.
Chapter IV presents and analyzes available data regarding
the effectiveness of the 1979 Agreement on Government
Procurement, and potential contract opportunities available in
the world government procurement market.
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations
regarding the current effectiveness of international
government procurement agreements and associated data
collection as well as their future prospects.
F. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis presents the content of existing documents and
provides interpretations from credible sources. No original
surveys are used to obtain procurement data for this study.
This paper only makes use of existing data regarding
international government procurement due to the overwhelming
volume of procurement information and the variability of
national procurement data collection systems coverage.
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Research for this thesis was conducted in a real time
environment -- the new AGP was still unresolved until April
15, 1994, and NAFTA's government procurement chapter was put
into place during the research period. While general GATT
and NAFTA issues have been openly and widely debated, there
has been little discourse specifically related to government
procurement. Accordingly, the greatest credence has been
placed on the information regarding the recent agreement as
presented by the principal governmental parties such as the
USTR and the European Union (EU).
Additionally an attempt has been made to incorporate as
much as possible of the sparse independent body of knowledge
concerning the 1979 AGP. The original intent of this research
was to present and analyze previously unpublicized USTR data
regarding public procurement. While USTR graciously provided
recent data, it represented nationally centered information
without even remotely uniform baselines from country to
country. This thesis will emphasize more refined data from
the Deloitte and Touche study used by the U.S. and EC during
the closing stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The
reader is assumed to have a basic knowledge of acquisition
terminology throughout this thesis.
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II. FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. THE FOUNDATION FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS
1. Comparative Advantage and Specialization
International Trade has existed for thousands of years
so that goods and services may be exchanged between people.
However, it was not until 1776 that the logical benefit of
free trade was succinctly stated by Adam Smith in The Wealth
of Nations:
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never
to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to
make than to buy.... If a foreign country can supply us
with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it,
better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our
own industry, employed in a way in which we have some
advantage(Blinder).
The "Law of Comparative Advantage" as put forth by Smith
has been and is the basis for international trade agreements
(Peterson p. 326). Smith used the timely example of English
wool and Portuguese wine to illustrate his point. The English
were more efficient in producing woolens because they had
ideal conditions for raising sheep. The Portuguese climate by
contrast was appropriate for vineyards. Consequently England
and Portugal specialized in supplying the item where each had
the most efficient production, wool and wine respectively. As
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England could produce more wool and Portugal more wine through
specialization, there was ultimately more wine and wool
available. Trade was the mechanism used to exchange the
larger amount of goods. This more efficient production that
allowed for distribution to either England or Portugal served
to increase the living standard in both countries and
facilitated further specialization and economic growth in
other markets.(Rothbard) This principle of comparative
advantage and specialization is the basis for free trade
agreements (Peterson, p. 326).
2. Governments and Free Trade
If there was no government involvement in trade
policies, a condition of free trade would exist. While all
trade is ultimately among individuals, the same logic applies
to governments, nations, and regions. In a free trade
environment, producers and consumers can be as likely to be
brought together across national boundaries as across state or
local borders. Governments, however have sometimes chosen to
pad their treasuries with external revenue from tariffs or to
erect barriers meant to protect worried, greedy, or
uncompetitive domestic industries. (Rothbard)
3. The Need for International Trade Agreements
The potential for misunderstandings among
international trading partners is enormous. Disputes are
inevitable in all trading relationships. This basic conflict,
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however, can be exacerbated by part of the unique set of
features peculiar to international trade: language, distance,
currency, culture, and business practices. Adding to this
friction in the international marketplace is the element of
government protectionist intervention, which is likely to be
perceived as preferential or unfair. Over the years,
bilateral and multilateral trade organizations and agree s
have been set up to deal with the peculiar complexities of
international trade (Rothbard). In geAeral, their goals have
been to keep world markets open so that members can benefit
through a linked economy that expands in the aggregate due to
specialization and comparative advantage trading (Peterson, p.
326).
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCURDMENT
1. Protectionism and Buy Domestic Policies
a. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
The formation of free trade agreements as they
relate to government procurement is rooted in the "buy-
domestic" movement of the early 1930's. In 1930, Congress
passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act establishing the highest
tariff levels in U.S. history. This Act was passed in direct
response to buy-British clauses being placed in nearly all
British public contracts (Goehle).
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b. Buy American Act
Subsequently, protectionist sentiment led to the
passage of the Buy American Act (BAA) in 1933. Its enactment
resulted from the existing clamor to reduce unemployment and
domestic manufacturers' concerns about foreign competition,
but it was also motivated by the lingering desire to retaliate
against other nations' buy-domestic policies. The BAA
prohibited the purchase of foreign products and specifiedD
general rules of origin, but it allowed waivers for various
reasons. The BAA was frequently criticized through the years
because the waivers were inconsistently applied by government
agencies. A 1954 Executive Order specified BAA
discrimination more directly by establishing a rule of origin
requiring that at least 50 percent of a U.S. product's
aggregate cost was from American sources.' The 1954 Order
also established offsets of six to 16 percent to be used in
judging foreign bids against domestic bids (Peterson). In
1962, the basic six percent preference was increased to 50
percent for defense procurznents (Pomeranz).
c. Buy-domestic Policies Abroad
Buy-domestic policies in other countries took on
less transparent methods after the Depression. There was a
marked tendency in European countries to prefer domestic
1 A "rule of origin" is the criteria used to determine
the nationality of a product or service for contract award
purposes.
10
suppliers. European governments' widely dispersed procurement
functions (relative to the American system) allowed
contracting officials great autonomy in choosing local
suppliers. To compound transparency concerns further, almost
no tenders were openly advertised, or they were offered to a
selective list of bidders. (Peterson) 2
d. Establishment of GATT
While buy-domestic policies were still in place,
the importance of one of their major goals--to reduce
unemployment- -waned after the Great Depression. Protectionist
trade policies became more commonly noted as a cause of the
Great Depression. Governments began to seek the efficient
allocation of world resources that were touted to be available
through less restricted international free trade. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formed as a temporary
organization in 1947 by 23 nations, was an outgrowth of this
change in philosophy. Its vision was for "most favored
nation" (MFN) arrangements which advocated nondiscrimination
in trade among members (Jackson, p. 208). GATT helped reduce
and eliminate many tariffs and trade barriers during the first
2 The term tender has a dual meaning in the international
procurement sector. While a tender is synonymous with the
solicitation (i.e., IFB, RFP, etc.), it is also used to label
the entire respective procurement process (i.e., open tender,
selective tender, and single tender). (Sherman, p.339)
13.
Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).3 GATT is
the preeminent international trade organization. Since its
beginnings it has sponsored accords preventing discrimination
in commercial trade among signatory governments. However, it
did not formally address government procurement until the
Tokyo Round which ended in 1979 (Peterson).
2. Beginnings of a Government Procurement Code
a. The OECD Forum
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) was formed in 1961 by nearly all of the
industrialized free market nations of the world to enhance
economic and social welfare among members and developing
nations (Rothbard). Although the OECD was not intended to
issue trade regulations, one of its purposes was to be a forum
for trade issues including discriminatory practices.
In 1962, Belgium and the United Kingdom brought
forth a complaint alleging procurement discrimination on the
part of the U.S. through the Buy American Act and specifically
its 50 percent defense offset. The OECD investigated the
complaint and issued their findings in 1964. At that point,
the U.S. delegate assented to study the case further and
3The Multilateral Trade Negotiations or "MTN" are the
periodic trade discussions used to formulate GATT policies and
agreements. There have been eight such rounds through the
years. The "Tokyo Round", held from 1973-1979 generated the
1979 AGP, and the "Uruguay Round", held from 1986 to 1993
produced the 1993 AGP (Low, pp.173, 209).
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succeeded in steering the OECD investigative committee's
purpose to one of reviewing overall government procurement
procedures among member nations (Pomeranz).
b. OECD Review of Government Procureme-t
The OECD secretariat issued a summary of members'
government procurement processes in 1966. It basically
reported that many countries were engaging in discriminatory
public procurement--not just the United States. The report
confirmed that "the United States stated clearly visible
percentage preferences for domestic suppliers, whereas most
other countries use highly invisible, administrative
procurement practices and procedures to achieve the 'buy
national' result" (Pomeranz, p. 1272).
Subsequently the OECD started to draft a set of
government procurement "guidelines." A 1967 draft text was
objected to by the U.S. largely because it removed offsets and
did not ensure open tendering in other countries. The U.S.
countered with a 1969 draft that used a single market -- the
heavy electrical equipment sector -- as a starting point for
crafting more complete government guidelines. The U.S. draft
signaled the beginning of eight years of OECD negotiations
(Pomeranz, p.1275).
Almost all critical government procurement issues
were addressed and in some cases resolved during the
negotiations. The OECD process defined much of what would
13
become -he Agreement on Government Procurement. Key topics of
the negotiations are addressed below.
"* One of the first revelations was that countries would be
unwilling to open a domestic market unless another country
reciprocated accordingly. A consensus thus developed for
a conditional most-favored-nation agreement where
advantages would only accrue to those who also took on
obligations.
"* Rules of origin were discussed and then dismissed because
of the extreme variance in rules between countries.
"* The OECD negotiations defined tendering procedures and
generally applied them to existing domestic processes.
"* The issue of procurement thresholds was addressed with the
U.S. pushing for low thresholds to gain EC business and
the EC resisting.
"* Procedures to make procurements as open as possible were
discussed. "Transparence" concerns were generally
resolved early in the negotiations.
In 1977, OECD government procurement negotiations
were transferred to the GATT for incorporation into the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The OECD executed
the transfer to utilize MTN's broader forum and to encourage
the possible inclusion of developing nations. The OECD had
drafted text that would in essence become GATT's Government
Procurement Code (Pomeranz, pp. 1264-1279). MTN finalized the
text by 1979 and the Agreement on Government Procurement was
signed.
3. The Agreement on Government Procurement
Since 1979, GATT's Government Procurement Code has
stood as the primary multilateral accord addressing public
14
procurement. Debate concerning international government
procurement inevitably comes back to the Code. It served as
the basis for the North American Free Trade Agreement's
government procurement chapter signed in 1992 and the new
Agreement on Government Procurement signed in 1993. Many of
the same issues addressed by the OECD were reviewed again or
developed further to craft the new agreements.
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III. DOCUMENT REVIEW
The Government Procurement chapter of the NAFTA and the
Agreements on Government Procurement from both 1979 and 1993
are rooted in the principle of reciprocity among the
signatories. The three accords attempt to establish and
impose basic requirements in conducting public procurement.
Each participating country is expected to conform to agreement
terms and in turn can expect other members to treat them
similarly. Generally, the terms of the agreements concentrate
upon openness, transparency, and competition, as well as fair
bid challenge procedures. Particularly in the case of the
1993 AGP, major debate has revolved around the annexes to the
agreements which delineate the specific government entities to
be included under the codes (Linscott). This chapter will
initially review the important features of the 1979 AGP and
then compare its features to the 1993 AGP and NAFTA's Chapter
Ten. A discussion of issues relevant to each document is
included in each section.
A. The 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement
1. 1979 AGP Purpose, Scope and Coverage
The 1979 AGP is comprised of a preamble, nine articles
and four annexes. The articles contain rules, procedures and
16
policies, while the annexes list the procurement entities
subject to the rules. The GPC provides that signatories will
give equal treatment to foreign and domestic suppliers in
competitions for certain contracts offered by specifically
listed central government entities. Customs duties are
excluded from this nondiscrimination provision. The AGP only
covers purchases of products above 150,000 Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs). (An SDR is a variable monetary unit which is
approximately equivalent to $1.30 today. It is used by GATT
to provide a uniform financial standard for international
trade calculations). Procurement of services is not included
under the Agreement. The Act also excluded purchases
involving 1) national security and war materials, 2) small
business preferences, 3) research and development, 4)
construction projects, 5) Army Corps of Engineers
requirements, 6) resale items, 7) Federal Prison Industries
and Blind and Other Severely Handicapped program items, 8)
lease or rental agreements, and 9) non-designated countries'
requirements (Golub, p.588).
2. U.S. Implementation of the 1979 AGP
The President has the authority to waive the Buy
American Act (BAA) under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(TAA). This can also be accomplished for even non-signatories
of the AGP who are willing to provide reciprocal opportunities
and for the least developed countries of the world (Peterson,
17
p. 339). The TAA provides the President with the ability to
reward a reciprocating country for compliance by waiving the
BAA and to punish non-compliers by invoking it (Pomeranz, pp.
1293-1298).
3. Rules of Origin
The 1979 AGP's relatively vague rule of origin asserts
that an article is generated by the country where it was
either "wholly produced and manufactured" or, for articles of
some foreign content, the product has been "substantially
transformed into a new and different article of commerce with
a name, character, or use distinct from that of the article or
articles from which it was so transformed." This definition
is at odds with existing domestically used formulas. For
example, the BAA requires that 50 percent of the "aggregate
cost" of an item must be domestic cost to be regarded as a
U.S. product. (OFPP Report, 1990) (Although Japan and most EC
countries technically do not have buy-national programs (and
hence the need for rules), they appear to generally assess
where a bidder is headquartered and operating to apply
observed domestic preferences.)
4. Transparence and Tendering Procedures
The 1979 AGP is intended to be "transparent," i.e.,
procurements must be open and predictably administered under
AGP standards. Accordingly, the system is designed to be
self-policing. It closely resembles U.S. Government
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procurement policies and does not represent much of a change
in the daily routine of American procurement personnel. For
other countries, the AGP's Government Procurement Code (GPC)
provides the only formal procurement guidance available. Some
of the GPC's uniform, nondiscriminatory procurement procedures
that ensure transparence are listed below:
"* Technical contract specifications issued under the AGP are
required to promote competition and not present obstacles
to international trade. They must use performance rather
than design criteria, actively employ international
standards and use brand-name-or-equal specifications as a
last resort.
"* AGP members must publish their procurement rules and
regulations.
"* Strict procedures for bid submission, opening, and award
are delineated including the requirement for written bids
and/or written confirmations after telegraphic bids.
"• Information relating to proposed purchases and actual
tenders should include sufficient data for international
bidders to respond. Such data include schedule, payment,
delivery date, bid closing date, language requirements,
and technical, financial, and performance requirements.
"* Procurement information will be published in one of the
"GATT languages"--English or French.
"* The GPC encourages open tenders (full and open
competition), followed by selective tenders (bidders must
prequalify), but discourages single tenders (sole source
procurements)(Sherman, 1991).4
"* Unsuccessful bidders must be notified in writing within
seven days after award; briefings are required for
interested unsuccessful offerors who request such
information.
41n sole source procurements, only one bidder is
solicited. This method is most appropriately applied when a
particular bidder possesses a unique ability to meet minimum
contract requirements.
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"* Contracts are awarded to the lowest price bidder or the
one that best meets the terms of the tender.
"* Invitations must be extended to the maximum number of
foreign and domestic suppliers.
"* Bidder qualification must be open and bidders' lists
published
"* A 30 day bid response time is required to allow bidders
sufficient time to prepare to compete. (The time was
altered to 40 days as a result of a 1988 protocol.)
"* Annual statistical reports are required to be submitted by
member nations detailing the value and number of contracts
awarded above and below $150,000 SDRs, and sole source
(single tender) procurements.
(Anthony,pp.1301-1343) (Peterson,pp.321-348) (Fiaschetti,pp.
1345-1358) (Pomeranz,pp.1263-1300) (Morgan,pp.1-13) (1979 AGP)
5. Bid Challenges
Dispute settlement under the AGP requires a member
nation to present complaints before a designated committee for
decision. Under the enforcement provisions, private
individuals must request that their government intercede on
their behalf if they have evidence of an unfair procurement.
Private individuals and businesses cannot present a case
directly before the committee. They must be sponsored by their
country (Linscott). The signatories also agreed to meet
annually to discuss enforcement provisions and general
objectives of the Agreement. (Peterson, p.345).
6. Special Treatment for Developing Nations
The AGP provides preferential treatment to countries
listed by the GATT as developing nations. In essence, they
20
are regarded as AGP members without becoming signatories.
The goal is to safeguard their balance of payments position
while establishing domestic industries and improving economic
growth through mutually beneficial regional and global
arrangements. Generally, it provides AGP nations with a foot
in the door for potentially large future markets in the
targeted countries (Anthony, p.1315-1318).
7. Compliance and Evaluation Concerns
All parties to the AGP, including the United States,
have been responsible to at least some degree for problems
experienced with the Agreement since 1979. A basic concern is
that few businesses are aware of it and most are ill-equipped
to take advantage of it. In addition, foreign governments
have not significantly opened procurements to international
competition, measured either as the number of open contracts
or their value. Much of this omission results from the high
monetary threshold levels required to invoke the AGP; small
purchases are effectively precluded from international
bidding. In addition, sole source and set-aside procurements
are exempted in signatory countries. 5 There are also
undeniable instances of noncompliance- -such as not allowing 30
days for bid submission and writing non-competitive
specifications--which essentially bar non-domestic bidders.
5
"Set-asides" refer to contracts reserved for certain
bidders. For example, a designated volume of government
procurement is reserved for small businesses in the U.S.
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The AGP's impact on the size of the government
procurement market has been overestimated. Some advertised
gains merely reflect the status quo while foreign firms
basically cannot capture others. Worldwide fuel purchases are
already open to foreign competition from limited suppliers,
yet were misrepresented as potential new gains. In other
cases, bilateral agreements opening procurements to
international tendering were in place before the AGP.
Furthermore, non-domestic businesses cannot be truly
competitive at providing products such as office furniture and
supplies because of the transportation costs imbedded in their
proposals. Finally, most foreign bidders are hard pressed to
meet even a 30-day proposal window given their traditional
tendering methods and language barriers.
Monitoring, assessing, and correcting noncompliance
issues has been undependable for all signatories at best.
Collecting data about compliance is difficult, and the data
collected are inconsistent and basically incomplete. The
United States recognized that embassies and American
businesses abroad were in the best position to observe
noncompliance, but both groups were unqualified or unwilling
to bring the problems to light. Businesses feared reprisals
from their host nations. Both State Department and business
representatives also expressed doubts about their ability to
detect infractions, such as a foreign government's splitting
a procurement to avoid an AGP threshold. Even when
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noncompliance allegations have arisen, there has been
apparently little expectation that the AGP's cumbersome and
subjective dispute settlement mechanism would provide
satisfaction. (GAO Report 1984)
Norway's inappropriate award of an automated tollbooth
system illustrates the problems involved with protesting an
unfair award under the AGP. Norway awarded a domestic concern
a large tollbooth contract for "research and development of a
new technology" involving a municipal tollbooth system. A
highly qualified U.S. vendor, who had done the work before,
protested the award to the USTR. Unfortunately, the contract
had already been performed, and the award could not be
reversed. Norway acknowledged the mistake and agreed not to
repeat it. However, the same scenario occurred again eight
months later when a similar automated tollbooth system was
purchased for the Norwegian city of Trondheim. USTR took the
U.S. vendor's complaint through the formal dispute settlement
process and won, but there was no financial reward; contract
performance had already been completed once again.
Fortunately, the U.S. vendor did not expect a financial
settlement but rather sought to "secure his international
reputation for the work" (Linscott).
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B. 1993 Agreement on Government Procurement
1. Overview
The revised Government Procurement Code accord was
accepted on December 15, 1993 at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round trade talks associated with the GATT. As with the old
Code, member nations specifically acceded to GPC terms--
GACT/World Trade Organization (WTO) concurrence does not
obligate or entitle a country to the GPC (Kantor February
1994). Initial signatories of the new Code were expected to
include Austria, Canada, the European Union (EU)/European
Community (EC), Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway,
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
South Korea is a new entry while Singapore has at least
temporarily dropped off (Murphy 1994). The Code will become
effective January 1, 1996. South Korea and Hong Kong,
however, will not be bound by the new terms until one year
later (BNA Trade Daily). Taiwan, the People's Republic of
China, and Australia are new countries expected to accede to
the Code in the near future (Kantor, February 1994).
The GPC consists of a 35-page code and 200 pages of
annexes. The annexes address the Code's coverage including:
1) central government entities, 2) subcentral government
entities, 3) other entities, 4) services, and 5) construction
work. (BNA Trade Daily) The Code's text has recently been
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made available on a limited basis. However, the much more
extensive annexes have not been made publicly available
because GATT officials hope to incorporate as many covered
services and governmental units as possible before formally
releasing them.
A number of GPC specifics were still unresolved as of
April 1, 1994. The biggest point of debate revolves around
subcentral (i.e., state and local) government coverage. This
contention will be decided via a series of bilateral
agreements (BNA Trade Daily). The United States has only
reached complete agreement with South Korea, Hong Kong, and
Israel. Agreement is based on reciprocal coverage for U.S.
states and foreign subcentral governments. Although the two
biggest players, the U.S. and the EU, formed a pact on this
issue on April 15, 1994, the U.S.'s final offer only included
specified markets in 36 states (these 36 states voluntarily
agreed to the AGP) (Linscott). The United States has excluded
all transportation services and research and development
services from the Code due to their potential sensitivity.
Certain aspects of the Uruguay Round coverage will continue to
be negotiated in the years to come (Linscott).
2. Improvements
a. Scope and Coverage
The new Code appears to be a substantial
improvement over the old Code. The old GPC covered only
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central government procurement of goods. With the new GPC,
there is also central government coverage of services and
construction contracts, as well as some coverage at other
levels--states, provinces, departments, prefectures, and even
ports, airports, and government owned utilities. The
thresholds vary in the 1993 agreement depending on the country
and entity. The threshold for U.S. federal government goods
and services is 130,000 SDRs. The threshold is 200,000 SDRs
for EC central governments and 355,000 for most U.S. state
governments. A standard threshold of 5 Million SDRs applies
for construction service contracts offered by the EC and U.S.
state and federal governments.
b. Tendering Procedures
The new GPC attempts to make the agreement more
reciprocal and transparent, but it closely resembles the old
code. To ensure equal treatment of eligible foreign
suppliers, regulations regarding new specifics of the
procurement process have been slightly expanded and clarified.
In contrast to the original agreement's broader guidelines,
the new GPC contains specific Articles and/or subsections
which stipulate rules for tendering, advertising, supplier
qualification, specifications, tender documentation, response
time limits, bid receipt and opening, contract award, and
post-award information. The new agreement provides an even
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closer tie to the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
(Linscott).
c. Bid Challenges
Disputes/Bid challenges have also received new
treatment in the 1993 AGP. Compliance with the Uruguay
Round's Dispute Settlement Understanding is mandatory in most
cases. The Understanding attempts to provide a single, time
sensitive, settlement process for virtually all trade
conflicts. The right to a panel review and decision is
guaranteed. The process requires that statements made to the
panel not be confidential and it empowers the panel to obtain
expert scientific and technical assistance as needed. The
entire dispute settlement process is intended to take less
than 16 months. Further actions can be taken for failure to
comply with panel judgements under the authority of Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Perhaps more significantly on the disputes front,
the Code now will require that signatories resolve AGP
bidders' challenges using domestic procedures. Private
foreign bidders will be able to directly challenge domestic
procurements they perceive as not complying with the Code.
They will be able to protest on their own behalf using the
host country's domestic legal procedures. They will
essentially have the same standing as a domestic bidder and
will not require their native government's sponsorship.
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d. Offsets
For the first time, under Article XVI, the Code
prevents using offsets as a condition for contract award.
There is an exception for vendors from developing countries.
The exception allows offsets to qualify these vendors for
bidding, but they cannot be used for award evaluation.
Currently, there are no developing countries that have
formally signed the Code (AGP) (Linscott).
e. Rules of Origin
The Uruguay Round also reached agreement to
standardize Rules of Origin within three years. This will
more clearly and usefully define what constitutes a foreign
product. The rules will not be applied retroactively.
f. Information Technology
The agreement recognized the need to respond to
changes in the automated global marketplace by including a
section addressing information technology advances. The
parties agreed to consult regarding the impact of such
advances and that the AGP should not pose an obstacle to
progress. Of particular note was the possible future
reduction of the 40 day bid response time (Linscott).
3. Suinary
The 1993 AGP improved on the original agreement.
Progress was made in all the contentious areas of the Uruguay
Round MTN- -coverage (particularly services and more government
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entities), offsets, tendering procedures, and bid challenges.
The negotiators also agreed to review and standardize rules of
origin in the near future.
While the 1993 AGP did not establish an absolute most
favored nation arrangement, it did create a conditional most
favored nation agreement. 6 The annexes represent a series of
reciprocal bilateral agreements that approximate the ideal
comprehensive agreement, but pepper it with a dose of
parochial realism. The 1979 AGP kept trade talks on
government procurement alive after the Tokyo Round and the new
AGP should achieve the same result. Specific new additions to
the AGP are already being discussed (Linscott).
C. Chapter Ten of NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed on
December 17, 1992 by representatives of the U.S., Canada and
Mexico. It entered into force on January 1, 1994. Chapter
Ten of NAFTA is 79 pages long and addresses public
contracting. NAFTA's government procurement provisions were
significantly influenced if not modeled after the AGP
(Muggenberg, p. 295) (Hufbauer, pp.1, 141). It is more
directly a reflection of the recent U.S. Canada Free Trade
Agreement chapter on government procurement. Mexico, it
should be noted, is neither a signatory to the AGP or the GATT
6Conditional MFN is defined as a "selected application of
trade rules and disciplines..." (Low, p.158).
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(Linscott). NAFTA's primary tenet--for the members to treat
signatories' goods and services the same as their own domestic
products--is directly taken from Article III of the AGP.
Similarly, NAFTA parties cannot discriminate against products
offered by local subsidiaries when those products originate in
Canada, Mexico, or the United States. However, specific rules
of origin may be used to differentiate particular commodities
listed in Chapter Three of NAFTA. (Muggenberg, p.297) (NAFTA
p.3-1 - 3-B-65) (Paul, p.40-41).
1. Scope, Coverage and Annexes
Federal government entities and selected federal
government enterprises are required to follow the Code in
their public procurement dealings. Unlike the 1993 AGP, state
and provincial governments are excluded from coverage.
However the parties will "endeavor to consult" during NAFTA's
first five years to obtain reciprocal commitments that
subcentral entities will abide by Chapter Ten directives (Paul
p.40-41).
Procurement thresholds for including public contracts
under NAFTA are $50,000 for both goods and services.
Construction services face a threshold of $6.5 Million. A
special threshold category exists for government-owned
enterprises, such as Mexico's energy, postal, railroad, water
and port authorities. Their minimum contract amounts are
$250,000 for goods and services and $8 Million for
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construction projects. All of the above values are indexed to
the U.S. inflation rate on a biennial basis.
Including government enterprises, such as Mexico's
massive energy cartels--Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) and
Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE), is probably the most
important achievement of the Government Procurement chapter.
Compliance for Pemex and CFE will gradually increase over a
ten-year period. A maximum of 50 percent of contracts can be
reserved for Mexican bidders in 1994, decreasing by five
percent a year and ultimately to zero in 2003. "Risk sharing"
contracts by Pemex (i.e., oil exploration contracts) are
excluded under the Chapter (Paul p.42) (Muggenberg, p. 302).
Some government services were excluded under the
agreement. All three countries excluded transportation,
research and development, public utilities and communications.
Coverage of all government financial services is excluded
under the code as is coverage of Canadian publication
contracts. Chapter Ten does not apply to national security
related procurement including arms, ammunition and weapons
purchases(Hufbauer, p. 141).
Of additional note is the fact that lease agreements
are specifically covered under Chapter Ten. Rules are
provided to calculate contract values for both fixed term and
open-ended rental agreements. Contract splitting to avoid
thresholds is also prohibited. (Muggenburg, p.296-29 7 ).
Procurement of patented pharmaceuticals will be opened
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immediately and non patented pharmaceuticals will follow eight
years later (Hufbauer, p. 141). Offsets are prohibited with
the same verbiage as the 1993 AGP's Article XVI. Due to
NAFTA's regional focus, no consideration is afforded to
exceptions relating to less developed countries (Muggenberg
p.295) (NAFTA p. 10-5). Similarly, Article VI of NAFTA
covering technical specifications uses the sane language as
the AGP to promote performance criteria, international
standards and brand-name-or-equal specifications where
appropriate (NAFTA p.10-5) (1993 AGP p.11-12).
Articles 1008 through 1016 address procurement
procedures which have been expanded from the U.S. Canada Free
Trade Agreement and are stricter than the AGP (Paul, p.43).
There are great similarities to U.S. Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) provisions. Specific areas of the tendering
process that were addressed include:
"* All suppliers must have equal access to information,
especially during the pre-bid stage.
"* For fairness, all suppliers must be qualified using a
single advertised qualification standard. Bidders must be
given the opportunity to come up to standards where time
is avai'lable.
"* Bidders must receive timely notice of the required
technical and financial capabilities.
"* Changes to approved bidders' lists must be published.
"* Invitations to bid must contain all essential elements
such as quantity, schedule and options. (Some government
enterprise contracts do not have to contain all areas of
information.)
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"* A time period of 40 days is required between the bid
invitation and the bid closing date.
"* Bid opening procedures closely resemble FAR provisions and
specify when a bid is late. Award data must be published
and unsuccessful offerors provided with pertinent
requested information.
"* Bidders cannot be excluded by virtue of never having
performed for a member government or within a specific
locality.
"* Exceptions for limited tendering are delineated (such as
sole source procurements to firms with unique capabilities
or due to urgency). Records of the limited tenders are
required (Muggenberg, pp.297-299) (Paul, pp. 43-45)
(NAFTA, pp.10-6 - 10-19).
The NAFTA section on bid challenge allows protests
regarding any part of the procurement process through contract
award to be presented to an impartial "reviewing authority."
NAFTA's dispute settlement procedure is also available as a
remedy. (Muggenberg, p. 302) It should be noted that Chapter
Ten does not specify bid protest procedures (Scanlon, p. 306).
The U.S. and Canada can take advantage of existing domestic
protest procedures. It is anticipated that U.S. courts will
take an active role in ensuring the assigned "reviewing
authority" acts consistently within the context of NAFTA and
accepted procurement principles. On the other hand, Mexico
will need to create a "review authority" and appropriate
procedures from scratch. The Mexican courts, who have
historically been much more laissez-faire in reviewing Mexican
government actions, will need to become actively involved in
the process (Paul, p. 46).
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Recognizing the complete procurement system renovation
required in Mexico, they are allowed a "best efforts"
compliance mechanism until January 1995. This provision
recognizes that Mexican compliance requires extensive
personnel training ana a new data collection and reporting
system. To the same end, the three parties agreed to meet
annually through 1999 to review transition problems and
discuss solutions including U.S. and Canadian technical
assistance to Mexico (Barrera, p. 302-303).
2. NAPTA Issues
Because NAFTA is similar to the AGP and FAR, Chapter
Ten's requirements do not present any new obstacles to the
United States or Canada. Mexico, on the other hand, faces a
difficult task. It must develop an entirely new procurement
system incorporating the specified tendering and protest
procedures (Barrera, p. 302).
Energy issues were delicately crafted into NAFTA. (GAO
1993, p.66). Canada and the United States gained by including
Pemex and CFE; however, there is a reasonable possibility that
these entities may be broken apart or privatized in the ten-
year period before 100 percent coverage is required. (Barrera,
p. 303).
NAFTA' s significant weaknesses are best viewed with an
eye to GATT. NAFTA potentially undermines the position of
the U.S. and Canada in the GPC by conflictingly facilitating
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the U.S. and Canada to prefer a non-AGP member over an AGP
member. Mexico is not a signatory to the GPC. In addition,
the 1993 AGP met with reasonable success in including
subcentral governments. NAFTA does not include state or
provincial governments, although it keeps the option open.
(Hufbauer, p. 141)
D. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE AGREEMENTS' MAJOR FEATURES
The following table provides a selective comparison of
the major features of the 1979 AGP, the 1993 AGP and NAFTA's
Chapter Ten.
TABLE I
HIGHLIGHTS AND COMPARISON OF THE AGREEMENTS' MAJOR FEATURES
FEATURE 1979 AGP 1993 AGP NAFTA
Coverage/ GOODS GOODS/SERVICES GOODS/SERVICES
Thresholds Central Govt Central Govt: Federal Govt:





>5 Million SDR >$6.5 Million
>$8 Million
(enterprises)
Nature Global Global Regional
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FRATURE 1979 AGP 1993 AGP NAFTA
Tendering General More detail Very detailed
Procedures
Rules of Rule of Existing Existing
Origin "Substantial domestic rules. domestic rules
transformation" Develop standard less some
rules in 3 yrs. commodities




Developing Encourages Encourages Does not
Nations participation participation address
Bid Govt must Private bidders Private bidders
Challenges sponsor private may use domestic submit to
bidder in procedures. domestic review
dispute. authority
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. AGP DATA COLLECTION
The variety of procurement data collection systems used by
AGP participants has presented continuing problems in
measuring the agreement's effectiveness. (GAO, 1983)
Statistics are primarily used to quantify the economic benefit
that member nations give and receive. As the final Uruguay
Round government procurement negotiations were closing, the
two principle parties to the agreement--the United States and
the European Community- -essentially chose not to directly use
existing statistical reports. Instead they commissioned an
independent but relatively subjective study to establish a
timely and uniform data baseline (within realistic
constraints). These data would provide the negotiators with
more direct comparative information. (Linscott)
1. Existing data collection system
a. Compliance issues
Resident within the goal of monitoring economic
benefit is the issue of complying with the terms of the
agreement. Data can be used to indicate compliance
difficulties, thus setting the stage for investigating suspect
contracts and tenders. One major dilemma in using procurement
data for compliance and enforcement is that the information is
37
stale by the time it is published and distributed. The United
States historically takes 11 months to report their statistics
to the GATT Committee. A majority of member countries take
longer. The statistics are still not released by the GATT
Committee until they have reviewed member inputs for
approximately 12 to 18 months. In 1989, the most recent
statistics available on an unrestricted basis were from 1985.
(GAO 1990) In April of 1994, the newest public procurement
statistics available outside the committee were from 1991.
Three year old information can be useful in establishing
patterns of noncompliance, but it is basically unusable in
preventing in-process violations. (Linscott)
b. Rules of origin
The varying definitions of what constitutes a
foreign product in a domestic market precludes taking
procurement data at face value. The situation has improved
since introducing a standardized report format in 1988 and
consolidating EC country reports. However, equating different
countries' meanings of foreign origin is still difficult and
evaluation is subjective.(GAO 1984, p.45)
c. USTR/GATT Data
Signatories to the Government Procurement Code are
required to submit annual statistical reports detailing the
total number of government contracts and corresponding
monetary value. The annual reports provided by the USTR
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office were detailed and extensive, but did not include all
data collected since the signing of the 1979 AGP. Generally,
recent annual reports include the number and monetary value of
government contracts. These statistics are then broken down
by procuring government entities, product categories, and by
the nationality of contract award recipients. Additional data
on single tenders (sole source procurements) are occasionally
incorporated. A summary table and comments regarding the data
totals are provided below.
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TABLE II
ABOVE-THRESHOLD* CONTRACT ' XALS FOR THE U.S., EC* AND JAPAN
(Values in SDR Millions)
Total U.S. EC Japan
Contract
Awards
T7otal number 7611 6118 8072




U.S. Number 7232 95.02 17 0.28 312 3.87
U.S. Value 14162 90.57 31 0.56 89 2.86
EC Number 97 1.27 6070 99.22 864 10.7
EC Value 354 2.26 5356 96.84 215 6.9
Japan Number 39 .51 1 0.02 6079 75.31
Japan Value 40 0.26 0.135 0.00 2653 85.17
Above the threshold of 150,000 SDRs
+ Less Greece, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands due to
incomplete data.
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(1) United States. Contracts awarded by United
States governmental entities above the threshold of 150,000
Special Drawing Rights (about $190,000) totaled 15.6 Billion
SDRs in 1991 (USTR 1991, VI, 10a) . This compares to 13.9
Billion SDRs in 1989 and 13.1 Billion in 1990. According to
1989/1990 data, above-threshold expenditures make up
approximately two-thirds of the total monetary value of U.S.
government procurement, so the data suggests a 23 Billion SDR
total government procurement market (USTR 1989, VI, 10a) (USTR
1990, VI, 10a). In 1991, 7,611 above- threshold contracts
were awarded; United States firms received 7,232 of the
contracts worth a total of 14.2 Billion SDRs. The European
Community was awarded 97 contracts representing a value of
354 Million SDRs. Japan received 39 contracts totaling
approximately 40 Million SDRs.(USTR 1991, pp. 1-2) Nine
hundred forty two (942) above-threshold sole source
procurements were awarded in 1991 totaling 961 Million SDRs.
Eight hundred eighty eight (888) of these, worth 856 Million
SDRs, were to U.S. firms; 11 contracts, worth about 8 Million
SDRs, were awarded to companies from the EC. (USTR 1991, VI,
16c)
(2) European Community. By comparison, the twelve
reporting countries of the European Community reported a total
of 6.8 Billion SDRs in above-threshold government expenditures
in 1991. The total EC government market, including below-
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threshold contracts, amounted to 13.8 Billion SDRs.
Statistics were incomplete for the total number of contracts;
however, reporting countries provided the following data for
above-threshold tenders (GATT EC, p.2):
"* Belgium: 129 of 129 contracts totaling 186 Million SDRs
were awarded to EC countries. 13 sole source tenders
representing 25 Million SDRs were awarded to the EC.(GATT
EC, pp. 3-7)
"* Denmark: 104 contracts totaling 102 Million SDRs (of 118
contracts totaling 109 Million SDRs) were awarded to EC
countries. The United States received 5 contracts worth
2.8 Million SDRs. 26 sole source procurements representing
11.8 Million SDRs were awarded to the EC. (GATT EC, pp. 4-
16)
"* Germany: 1,072 contracts totaling 797 Million SDRs (of
1085 contracts totaling 809 Million SDRs) were awarded to
EC countries. The United States received 3 contracts
worth 2.1 Million SDRs. 569 sole source tenders
representing 463 Million SDRs were awarded to EC
vendors.(GATT EC, pp. 17-23)
"* France: 1909 contracts totaling 1.59 Billion SDRs were
awarded to EC countries. Only one other contract was
awarded -- to the United States for approximately $2
Million SDRs. 790 sole source tenders representing 696
Million SDRs were awarded to the EC. (GATT EC, pp.24-33)
"* Ireland: 35 contracts totaling 58.3 Million SDRs (of 37
contracts totaling 77.8 Million SDRs) were awarded to EC
countries. The United States received one contract worth
19.2 Million SDRs. Eight sole source tenders representing
4.9 Million SDRs were awarded to EC suppliers. (GATT EC,
pp. 34-38)
"* Italy: 1170 contracts totaling 705 Million SDRs (of 1174
contracts totaling 709 Million SDRs) were awarded to EC
countries. The United States received two contracts worth
1.5 Million SDRs. 387 sole source tenders representing
366 Million SDRs were awarded to the EC. (GATT EC, pp. 39-
41)
"* Luxembourg: 12 of 12 contracts totaling 7.3 Million SDRs
were awarded to EC countries. Four sole source tenders
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representing 1.5 Million SDRs were awarded to the EC.
(GATT EC, pp. 42-45)
6 United Kingdom: 1639 contracts totaling 1.901 Billion SDRs(of 1653 contracts totaling 1.91 Billion SDRs) were
awarded to EC countries. The United States received five
contracts worth 3.2 Million SDRs. 287 sole source tenders
representing 281 Million SDRs were awarded to EC
suppliers. ýGATT EC, pp. 46-64)
Based on these incomplete data, the United States has won at
least 17 1991 European Community contracts, receiving an
economic benefit totaling approximately 30.8 Million SDRs.
(3) Japan. Japan's 1991 above-threshold total was
3.1 Billion SDRs out of a total 7 Billion SDR government
market (GATT Japan, p. 3). There were 8,072 covered
contracts. Of the total, 6,079 contracts totaling 2.65
Billion SDRs were awarded to Japanese bidders. By comparison
United States' companies were awarded 864 contracts totaling
215 Million SDRs and EC concerns were awarded 312 contracts
with a monetary value of 89 Million SDRs. (GATT Japan, p. 4)
Fifty five (55) sole source tenders representing a value of
approximately 74 Million SDRs were awarded to Japanese bidders
(GATT Japan, p.24).
The annual statistical reports generated by
AGP member countries and disseminated by the GATT Committee
provide an interesting picture of international procurement,
if taken at face value. The overall government markets are
huge. By virtue of each country's own report, there are
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relatively small pieces of the eligible government pies being
awarded to foreign firms.
2. Deloitte and Touche Public Procurement Study
The overwhelming volume of public procurement
opportunities among Government Procurement Code signatories is
generated by the United States and the European Community.
These two principal participants can, in essence, determine if
AGP negotiations are consummated or stalemated (Linscott).
The timely signing of the AGP in 1993 was facilitated by the
United States/EC consensus to use the accounting firm of
Deloitte and Touche to develop an international government
procurement database. The data would provide subjective, but
comparable information that could be realistically and
productively referenced by both parties. (Linscott)
a. Metbodology
The Deloitte study, released in April 1994,
provided trade representatives from the United States and the
European Union with:
... an assessment of the value and the international
bidding opportunities for goods, services, and
construction contracts that are likely to be placed in
1995 by each of several thousand entities offered or
requested by the U.S. or the EC in the context of
renegotiation of the GATT Government Procurement
Agreement. The entities covered are at all levels of
government including central/federal, regional or state,
and local. The study also encompassed utilities (and some
state-owned commercial enterprises in Europe). The
assessment focused on procurements by those entities which
were above certain specified monetary thresholds.
(Deloitte, p. 7)
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Procurement thresholds closely approximating the AGP
thresholds were used in the study. The U.S. thresholds
differed slightly from the EC thresholds; however the variance
was mutually agreed upon. (Deloitte, p. 7)
The study attempted to impose uniformity in the
face of extremely variable data. The stuidy sought to: 1)
quantify the "value of contracts awarded" as opposed to
"expenditure under procurement contracts" in a given year
(from budget accounts); and 2) divide procurement totals into
a commodity group (goods, services, or construction services)
so as to better measure existing and future coverage under the
Agreement. (Deloitte, p. 10)
The study gathered United States central
government data from the Federal Procurement Data System
(FPDS). France was the only European country to have a
comprehensive procurement data system. Understandably, gaps
had to be filled in to get a complete picture. Ongoing
national and EC procurement surveys were used for five
countries. These were pieced with other informative but
incomplete data, including data from the Official Journal of
the European Union, budgetary accounts, government accounting
reports, professional associations, and other independent
studies/surveys. Deloitte used their own surveys in late 1993
for almost all cases where reliable central data were not
available. The surveys were a validating if not primary
information source for EC central and subcentral governments
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(save France), the 50 states, the 24 largest U.S. cities and
all public utilities. (Deloitte, pp.11-13)
b. United States Data
(1) Federal Government. Deloitte's U.S. data
collection effort used the Federal Government's $176,000 goods
and services threshold for federal contracts. All U.S.
construction contracts were given a procurement threshold of
$6.5 Million before considering eligibility for AGP foreign
bidding. (Deloitte, pp. 7-8) Using FPDS it was determined
that t-tal U.S. Federal Government contract expenditures in
1992 amounted to $180 Billion, but only $62 Billion
represented new 1992 contracts; the remainder was from
previous years' contracts. (Deloitte, pp. 17-18)
Approximately $55 Billion of the $62 Billion was over
threshold. A "scrubbed" total of $43 Billion out of this was
eligible for reasonable inclusion as an AGP benefit after
eliminating excluded product categories (for example, national
security).(Deloitte, pp. 19)
An attempt was made to determine the
percentage of AGP eligible contracts that would fall under
preference programs and set-asides such as small business,
labor surplus, 8(a), sheltered workshops, and Buy Indian.
1989 was used as a base year for calculations because it
reflected more complete contract life cycle costs. (The
majority of the "value of contracts awarded" from this year,
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including options, had already been realized by 1993.) By
comparison, the scrubbed new contract figure for 1989 was
approximately $50 Billion. About 18.2 percent of the scrubbed
figure was in fact not fully open to foreign bidding because
of these set asides. Preliminary data from 1992 indicated a
similar percentage would apply in that year as well.
(Deloitte, pp. 21-22) Thus, approximately $35 Billion would be
fully open to foreign bidders in 1992.
(2) State Governments. The thresholds for state
government entities and utilities were $250,000 for goods and
$500,000 for services. All construction contracts were given
a procurement threshold of $6.5 Million. (Deloitte, pp. 7-8)
The Deloitte study attempted to provide a picture of the
overall market for the 50 U.S. States, and a more in-depth
look at the 24 States that were definitely included in the
U.S. offer to the EC as a part of AGP negotiations in 1993.
Procurement procedures and systems differ widely among the 50
state governments. Totals were largely ascertained by surveys
in late 1993. They indicated a total state government market
of $33 Billion (unadjusted for set-asides in all states).
Set-asides, preference programs, and protected entities were
more fully assessed for the 24 states included in the U.S.
offer at the time of the survey. Programs varied widely.
Procurement opportunities for foreign bidders in those States
were 71.8 percent of the total as a result of set-asides
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(Deloitte, pp. 24-29). If the same rate of dilution applied
to all states, the total state government market would be
approximately $24 Billion.
(3) Major U.S. Cities. The thresholds for city
government entities and utilities were $250,000 for goods and
$500,000 for services. All construction contracts were given
a procurement threshold of $6.5 Million. (Deloitte, pp. 7-8)
Surveys from the 24 largest municipalities indicated that
municipal governments represented an eligible market of $8.6
Billion for foreign bidders. No detailed examination of set-
aside programs was conducted, however Deloitte estimated that
foreign bidders' contract opportunities would be reduced by
approximately ten percent. Government-owned utilities serving
these 24 cities were also reviewed. Ports, airports,
electric, gas and water utilities, and transit/transportation
authorities were included. A market of $7.8 Billion was
identified (unadjusted for set-asides and Buy-American
provisions).(Deloitte, pp. 145-146)
(4) Mandated Buy-American Programs. The Deloitte
study included a review of federally supported programs for
state and local governments that mandated Buy-America
restrictions. These programs included federal aid highway
funds, federal transit administration grants, airport
improvement grants, waste water revolving fund grants, Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) and telephone loans.
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(Deloitte, p. 196) The study placed considerable emphasis on
these programs because the EC consistently targeted them as a
source of U.S. concessions during the Uruguay Round AGP
negotiations (Linscott). The following illustrates the extent
of discrimination against foreign vendors in each of the
programs (Deloitte, pp. 196-197):
"* Highway funds for states require a 25 percent award
preference for U.S. steel. Steel is an integral component
and major cost in highway construction. This offset
essentially excludes foreign companies from an $800
Million steel market, about half of which is above
threshold. (Deloitte, pp.196-198)
"* Mass transit funds require purchases to include 50 percent
American components or a 25 percent offset is used for
contract award. Foreign competitors are essentially
prohibited from a $3.45 Billion market. (Deloitte, pp.
199-200)
"* Contracts funded by Airport grants require 60 percent
American content or invoke a 25 percent offset. Foreign
bidders are all but excluded from a $2.2 Billion market.
(Deloitte, pp. 201-202)
"* Foreign contractors can successfully bid on waste water
grant projects and REA and telephone loan contracts;
however, REA uses a six percent offset for evaluating non-
American components in evaluation. (Deloitte, pp. 203-206)
c. European Community Data
(2) Central and Sub-central Data. Thresholds for
the EC countries were set for the Deloitte study in terms of
European Currency Units (ECUs). ECUs are currently equivalent
to about 1.18 U.S. dollars. The central government goods and
services threshold was set at 125,000 ECUs; goods for other
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entities was set at 200,000 ECUs; services for other entities
at 400,000 ECUs; and the construction project threshold was
set at 5 Million ECUs. The European thresholds are not
identical in monetary value to U.S. thresholds but are
reasonably similar. They were mutually agreed upon by the EC
and United States for purposes of the Deloitte study.
(Deloitte, pp. 7-8) Actual GATT negotiations, however,
established thresholds that were 13 percent lower. (Deloitte,
p. 225)
It should be noted that data quality is poorer
for EC countries than the United States. Much of the Deloitte
data was inferred from information expressed in terms of
expenditures or total project costs versus documented annual
contract value. In addition, data had to be retrofitted into
an appropriate category--above or below- threshold. In
addition, many "enabling arrangements" (similar to a General
Services Administration catalog setup) were in place, but not
counted as contracts. Similarly, individual purchases of
generally small value items were not counted as contracts.
(Deloitte, pp. 224-225) Adjusted data for EC countries are
reported in Table I.
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TABLE III
EC AND U.S. ABOVE- TEESHOLD ANNUAL PROCUREMENT VALUES
(ECU Millions)
COUNTRY CENTRAL SUB- TOTAL
CENTRAL
Belgium 410 1850 2260
Denmark 480 1540 2020
France 9080 19450 28530
Greece 760 1910 2670
Ireland 40 80 120
Italy 5280 9130 14410
Luxembourg 75 45 120
Netherlands 980 1540 2520
Portugal 900 1380 2280
Spain 5170 6420 11590
UK 12985 15130 28115
EC 471 471
TOTAL EC 43781 91315 135096
TOTAL US 29661 27966 57627
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Existing laws and procedures in a number of
EU countries excludc -hree major procurement sectors from
full foreign vendor bi. 1. These were: 1) defense sensitive
procurements, 2) air tr. control equipment and systems,
and 3) other specifically E> 'luded services. The above
numbers were adjusted for thes -• •usions. Approximately 25
to 40 percent of defense rela•=a expenditures could be
considered "non-warlike" and thus eligible for foreign
bidding. (Deloitte, pp. 219-225)
(2) Utilities. Above-threshold contract totals for
publicly owned enterprises in the European Union were
calculated to be 37.759 Billion ECUs. Utilities were not
broken down by individual countries. The airport market was
1.423 Billion, electrical utilities were 20.235 Billion, ports
were 761 Million ECUs, urban transportation was 4.7 Billion,
and water utilities accounted for 10.64 Billion ECUs.
(Deloitte, pp. 227)
B. ANTICIPATED NAFTA DATA
Actual data related to the effectiveness of the North
American Free Trade Agreement generally have not been
published. Most data supporting NAFTA related government
procurement opportunities consist of state sponsored studies.
They address total market size and anticipated expansion.
These are only general estimates as to what extent a NAFTA
member will capture another signatory's public procurement
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market in a given area. The most significant government
procurement opportunity involves gradually opening the Mexican
petroleum consortium (Pemex) and state electrical commission
(CFE) to Canadian and U.S. bidders. This market is scheduled
to be 100 percent open in ten years (Hufbauer 1993). Pemex
and CFE represent a six to nine billion dollar market, 50
percent of which will open in the first year (USITC 1993).
Much of NAFTA will have no immediate impact on U.S. and
Canadian bidders. For example, pharmaceuticals will still be
preferentially procured by most of the effected major Mexican
government agencies until the year 2002. Similarly, NAFTA
does not effect the preferential U.S. procurement policy for
defense related bearings; they are only purchased from
Canadian or domestic sources. (USITC 1993)
C. International Bidding Potential and Data Interpretation
1. Overall Market Potential
Potential trade growth motivates any free trade
agreement. Opening market segments to foreign bidders under
GATT was reviewed in the Deloitte study. The objective was to
measure all available enhanced trade possibilities between the
U.S. and EC; and this in turn would roughly correlate to
growth in public sector procurement. American and European
trade associations were consulted for their judgments on the
public sector procurement potential in their specific
commodity or service markets. The information showed the
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massive markets for individual goods and services. Openness
to foreign suppliers and research and development expenditures
held promise for would-be foreign traders. (Deloitte, pp. 302-
308)
Services were carefully addressed since they were not
generally included under the 1979 Agreement on Government
Procurement. The service sector accounts for approximately 60
percent of economic activity and employment on both sides of
the Atlantic (Deloitte, p.309). Only about half of the
industry respondents expressed interest in taking advantage of
the increased opportunities for business across the Atlantic
(Deloitte, p.313). Many businesses were only partially
informed, but deterred by perceived obstacles (i.e., U.S.
regulations such as the Buy American Act) (Deloitte, P.314).
The Deloitte study did not provide commentary on overall
market potential as requested by both the U.S. and EC
(Deloitte, p.309).
2. Data Interpretation
Measuring the absolute economic impact of the
Agreement on Government Procurement is impossible (Anthony,
1979 p. 1342). The data presented in this chapter are
incomplete in terms of quantifying the public procurement
market, much less the overall market on both sides of the
Atlantic. Inaccuracies result from subjective determinations.
On the other hand, the information certainly provides a
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general picture of the magnitude of public contracting
opportunities currently available in Europe and the United
States.
In a hypothetical alternative situation that precluded
international trade whenever practical, government imports
could be zero except in the case of contracts with unique
monopolistic foreign suppliers. The probable government
market size as estimated in the Deloitte study represents the
low end of possible opportunities (since it excludes market
expansion due to regular growth and free trade). The
potential effectiveness of the original AGP was approximated
by measuring the difference between these two figures. While
imperfect, this method probably represents the best way to
view the more recent but uneven data from the Deloitte study
and the GATT annual statistical reports. Interpretation today
would have to be the same- -that the opportunities for economic
welfare gains are significant, and far superior to a
protectionist reality. (Deardorff, 1979 pp.80-85) It could be
more revealing (and perhaps fruitful) to have hard totals for
contract value, but using an opportunity based measurement
appears to be the ongoing philosophy of GATT and the United
States Trade Representative's Office, whether by design or
necessity because of low quality data (Jamushian).
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal conclusions and recommendations drawn from
this research are presented below, followed by answers to
research questions and topic areas recommended for further
research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Signatories to trade agreements must, to some degree,
believe in the law of comparative advantage as a valid
economic theory to rationally expect economic benefit.
Protectionist buy-domestic policies are commonly perceived to
bring more direct domestic benefit unless there is an
appreciation of the greater gains to be made by applying the
law of comparative advantage and specializing in efficient
production and trading. Existing procurement data from the
1979 AGP indicate a substantial government market potentially
available to international traders, but are inconclusive in
directly supporting the agreement's success or failure.
Although convincing facts are needed to rebut a common bias in
favor of buy-domestic policies, data on government procurement
actions under the 1979 AGP are inadequate for an in-depth
comparison of member countries. Inadequacies reflect the
variety and/or low quality of procurement data systems and
procedures used by signatory nations.
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The terms of the 1979 AGP, the 1993 AGP, and NAFTA's
Chapter Ten are very similar to one another. They generally
address recurrent areas of concern in a similar manner. They
each reflect, for their time, the current state of an evolving
government procurement code that began with the OECD.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The AGP should require standardized procurement data from
signatories based on GATT-established uniform thresholds and
rules of origin. The best vehicle to achieve this goal would
be a GATT-approved automated procurement data system designed
to accommodate the existing systems used by members.
Justified data would be centrally collated under the auspices
of GATT. The Deloitte study could be used as a starting point
for such a project because it still provides a timely glimpse
of the specific problems encountered with incomparable data.
Procurement data should be published in a form that
clearly informs government officials and the general public
about the magnitude and reciprocation of government contracts
between nations. The information should be used to provide
substantive fuel for the debate between protectionists and
free trade advocates.
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C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Responses to the subsidiary research questions are
provided, followed by the answer to the primary research
question.
0 What are the purposes of NAFTA and GATT?
NAFTA and GATT promote free trade by removing tariffs and
discriminatory domestic procurement practices among
signatories. The agreements' ultimate purpose is to increase
members' standards of living through an expanded aggregate
economy brought about by GATT or NAFTA sponsored free trade
among member nations.
* What are the specific features of NAFTA's government
procurement chapter and of the AGP?
Both AGPs and NAFTA's Chapter Ten are conditional MFN
agreements. Members generally do not receive benefits from
another country without a reciprocal obligation to the other
country. All three agreements delineate public procurement
policies and regulations in order to achieve reciprocity among
signatories. Each agreement has consistently focused on the
areas of 1) national treatment and non-discrimination, 2)
government entities and goods/services covered by the
agreement, 3) threshold levels required to invoke the
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agreement, 4) rules of origin, 5) detailed transparent
tendering procedures, and 6) bid challenges.
* What similarities and differences exist between A) the
1979 AGP, B) NAFTA's government procurement chapter and
C)the 1993 AGP?
The 1979 AGP served as the foundation for the two
subsequent agreements. Both AGPs are globally focused
agreements that seek expanded membership and incorporate
special treatment for developing nations. NAFTA's Chapter Ten
is regional in nature and limited to its three signatories.
The 1993 AGP improves upon the 1979 AGP by including new
coverage for services and subcentral govgrnment entities, a
bid challenge procedure that allows protests by private
foreign bidders, and an article prohibiting offsets in
determining contract award.
NAFTA's government procurement chapter adds more detail
than both the AGPs. Like the 1993 AGP (and unlike the 1979
AGP) it covers services and government-owned enterprises, and
prohibits offsets. It does not however, clearly mandate a bid
challenge process.
* What is the effect of the Buy American Act on intended
trade objectives of NAFTA and GATT?
GATT largely exists to counter protectionist policies such
as the BAA. In sectors where the AGP and NAFTA are in force,
the BAA can be waived, thus allowing equal bidding
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opportunities to foreign suppliers. Generally, when Buy-
America requirements are executed (such as in the Federally
funded highway projects cited in the Deloitte study), foreign
bidders are effectively deterred from the U.S. public
procurement marketplace.
0 Has the 1979 AGP been successful in increasing
international trade opportunities?
It is impossible to state with certainty that the 1979 AGP
has been successful when GATT's existing historical public
procurement statistics are used as a basis for the judgment.
Even the Deloitte study does not clearly show a rising number
or value of public contracts. It concludes by attempting to
quantify, without cotimnent, the magnitude of the overall
transatlantic market. However, if the world economy, mostly
shaped by GATT nations, has expanded in the past fifteen years
(which this thesis does not attempt to assert), the AGP may
have played a small role in its expansion by promoting an
additional but indeterminant number of international free
trade transactions in the public sector.
The primary research question is:
* Based on historical data, what is the probable effect on
trade opportunities of the North American Free Trade
Agreement's government procurement chapter and the
Government Procurement Code of the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade?
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The answer to this *uestion cannot be determined with
certainty. The inconsistent historical data gathered on the
1979 AGP provide little assistance in determiLing the trend or
extent of international trade opportunities. This judgment
must essentially be made, partly on faith, using the same
general information and economic theory that was available
before the 1979 AGP was in place. The conclusion reached by
this thesis, that trade opportunities will increase, is based
on the belief that the law of comparative advantage will
expand economies in the aggregate and thus increase commercial
(and public) opportunities. The contrary conclusion- -that
trade opportunities will not increase--requires belief in the
logic of protectionism: it does not make sense to give away
what could be kept at home. Were data available to clearly
support either position, it could strongly influence a move to
expand international trade agreements or, alternatively, to
bolster buy-domestic legislation. As it stands, any near
term change in government sector trade opportunities in member
countries will reflect the delicately balanced (and currently
unquantifiable) effect of the AGP and NAFTA interacting with
the buy-domestic policies they are intended to counteract.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following topics related to this thesis represent
possible areas for further research:
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"* Chronicle and evaluate the U.S. legislation which
implements the 1993 AGP. What are its features and
relationship to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979?
"* Reassess AGP procurement data and data collection systems
after implementing the 1993 AGP. Have they improved and
what is the economic impact?
"* Assess NAFTA procurement data and data collection systems
as information becomes available. What is the economic
impact?
"* Examine the initial use of 1993 AGP bid challenge
procedures by private foreign bidders. Were foreign
bidders using domestic procedures in a manner similar to
and with comparable success as a domestic bidder?
"* Evaluate the complete overhaul of the Mexican government
procurement system that is in essence required by NAFTA's
Chapter Ten. Is Mexico able to meet the requirements of
Chapter Ten?
"* Study the U.S. states' implementation of the 1993 AGP.
Are the varied procurement systems able to comply with the
terms of the AGP?
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